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Case No. 20150840-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
MANUEL ANTONIO LUJAN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 (Addendum A).  The Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (West 2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
 Kendall Oney couldn’t sleep and was sitting in the driver’s seat of his 
car at 3:30 in the morning when Defendant opened the door and squatted 
down, putting his exposed face mere inches away from Oney’s face.  
Defendant looked directly at Oney and said, “Why you following me?“  The 
dome light and the dashboard lights illuminated the pair as they looked at 
each other.  After several seconds, Defendant stood and reached toward 
what Oney believed to be a weapon tucked in his waistband.  Oney slowly 
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stood, putting the two once again face-to-face for several more seconds in 
an area lit by two street lights, a porch light, a flood light, and the car’s 
headlights.   Oney spoke calmly and watched Defendant while at the same 
time moving slowly around both Defendant and the car before bolting for 
his house.  Defendant then stole Oney’s car.  Oney immediately called 
police with a description of Defendant: a Hispanic male, about 5’10”, 180 
pounds, with long hair, and wearing a black leather jacket and a black 
beanie. 
 Within 20 minutes of Oney’s early morning call, officers had:  
followed a leak from Oney’s driveway to the stolen car parked next to a 
walkway that led to an elementary school; established a containment area 
and a visible police presence; followed a canine from the car near the school; 
discovered Defendant curled up inside a component of the school’s exterior 
air conditioning unit; and obtained Oney’s positive identification of 
Defendant.  Defendant matched the description Oney gave police, including 
height, weight, build, coloring, ethnicity, and clothing.  He had a “scraggly” 
salt and pepper goatee that had not been mentioned, and he had no hair 
sticking out from under his beanie.  When asked why he was there at the 
school, Defendant stated, “[S]omebody is following me.”  Oney thereafter 
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identified Defendant as one of two familiar individuals at a lineup, then 
positively identified him at the preliminary hearing and at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 This Court granted certiorari review on the following issues: 
 1.  “Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred 
in reversing the district court’s denial of Respondent’s motion to suppress 
eyewitness identification testimony.” 
 2.  “Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred 
in holding the State was required to demonstrate that any error in 
admission of the eyewitness identification was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and whether it erred in concluding the admission of that 
testimony was not harmless.”  
 Standard of Review.  On certiorari, this Court reviews decisions of the 
court of appeals for correctness.  Rahofy v. Steadman, 2012 UT 70, ¶7, 289 
P.3d 534. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following constitutional provision is reproduced in Addendum 
B: Utah Const. art. I § 12.  
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
Defendant’s encounter with the victim—“Why you following me?” 
 Forty-year-old Kendall Oney was an amateur astronomer, familiar 
with late-night and early-morning stargazing and used to getting up in the 
very early morning.  R357:15-18.  So when he found himself unable to sleep 
around 3:30 a.m. on November 25, 2012, he got out of bed.  R357:15-18, 65.  
The night was overcast, so he decided to use the time to get his car ready for 
its annual inspection.  R357:16-18, 22, 65.   
 As he sat in the driver’s seat in his driveway checking the starter, 
gauges, and lights, he came face-to-face with Defendant, who opened the 
driver’s door and squatted next to the seat looking directly at Oney.  
R357:16-18, 29, 34-35, 74-77.  His face was about ten inches from Oney’s face, 
was not obscured by any covering, and was lit by the car’s “[f]airly bright” 
interior lighting, which included both the dome and dashboard lights.  
R357:17-18, 26, 35, 77.  As Oney stared at Defendant’s face, Defendant asked, 
“Why you following me? Why you following me?” R357:18, 35, 77.   
 Oney initially thought Defendant might want a drink or a ride.  
R357:18.  But after about ten seconds, Defendant stood up, opened his jacket 
and reached for the handle of something tucked into his waistband.  
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R357:18, 35-36, 39, 77.  The movement left Oney looking directly at 
Defendant’s torso and hands, and upwards at his face.  R357:37-38, 78.  
Oney’s surprise turned to fear, and he decided to get back to the house.  
R357:18-19, 35, 41, 78, 81.  He stood up, putting himself face-to-face with an 
equally-tall Defendant and so close that the men were “almost touching.”  
R357:37-38, 49-50, 101.  At the same time, Oney started talking calmly to 
Defendant, asking what was going on and if he was all right.  R357:18-19, 
35.  For about five seconds, Oney moved slowly around Defendant and the 
car as he talked, paying special attention to Defendant’s face and hands and 
never losing sight of him.  R357:36-38, 40-41, 82.  Defendant moved with 
Oney, ultimately moving into the car’s headlights.  R357:36, 41, 51.   
 Oney saw Defendant as he stood up because of illumination from 
multiple sources: 
• the car’s headlights (R357:27); 
 
• the porch light by the back door of the house about twenty feet away 
(R357:29, 67-68; State’s Exh. 19); 
 
• a street light at the front of Oney’s house about thirty yards away 
(R357:32-35; State’s Exh. 9, 18); 
 
• a street light in the front yard of the house behind Oney’s car about 
thirty-five feet away (R357:33, 69-72; State’s Exh. 17);  
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• a flood light on the house next door to the driveway about forty feet 
away, which shown on Defendant from behind (R357:30-34; State’s 
Exh. 16); and 
 
• the reflection of the street lights and other lighting off the clouds 
(R357:18, 26).   
 
The trees were bare, allowing the multiple lighting sources to leave the area 
“fairly well illuminated.”  R357:22-23, 26.  In fact, the circumstances 
provided “pretty bright” lighting, allowing Oney to see Defendant and to 
judge his movements.  R357:19, 22, 25-26.   
 After about five seconds of maneuvering, Oney turned and ran for his 
house.  R357:19, 40-41.  He immediately turned on the flood lights on the 
back of his house, woke up his brother, and stepped back outside in time to 
watch Defendant squeal away in his car to the end of the driveway before 
turning north and speeding away.  R357:19, 29-30, 42-43, 67-69, 90-91; State’s 
Exh. 13, 14. 
Defendant’s capture by police—“[S]omebody is following me.” 
 Oney called the police and gave a description of the car thief—a 
Hispanic male, about 5’10”, 180 pounds, with long hair, and wearing a black 
leather jacket and a black beanie.  R357:42-44, 50, 83-87, 91; R359:10-12.  
Officer Shawn Bias responded from nearby within a minute of getting the 
dispatch.  R357:110, 117.  While talking with Oney, Bias noticed a trail of 
liquid on the ground leading from where the car had been parked to the end 
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of the driveway, then turning north the way Oney’s car had gone.  R357:45, 
119-20.  The officer immediately left to follow the trail, which led directly to 
Oney’s abandoned car a few blocks away.  R357:46-48, 119-20, 125-32; 
R359:13; State’s Exh. 1.  It was stopped at a curb a few blocks from Oney’s 
house in front of a fenced concrete pathway leading to the schoolyard of an 
elementary school.  R357:120-21; State’s Exh. 21, 23, 24.   
 Because no more than ten minutes had passed since Oney’s call to 
police, Bias believed that the suspect could still be nearby.  R357:122-23.  
The location and the officer’s years of experience led him to believe that the 
suspect may have seen the police, abandoned the car, and hid.  R357:124. 
Consequently, the officer called for a K-9 unit to help locate the suspect and 
for additional officers to set up a containment barrier to prevent his escape.  
R357:122-23.   
 Officer Swazo and his dog arrived shortly after, and the dog wasted 
no time picking up a scent and leading the officers “very strongly” from 
Oney’s car to the nearby pathway, then down the pathway and across the 
schoolyard toward the school.  R357:125-29, 143-44; R359:17.  Officer Swazo 
handled the dog while Officer Bias followed behind him with his flashlight 
on and gun drawn.  R357:128-29.  Officer Bias was mere feet into the 
schoolyard when he heard a noise coming from the direction the dog was 
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tracking. R357:129, 145; R359:17.  It sounded to him like a person jumping a 
chain link fence.  Id.   
 Several portable classrooms—each an individual building—were 
clustered next to the school building on the path the dog was tracking.  
R357:128-30, 147; State’s Exh. 27 (showing where classrooms stood before 
being removed).  While Officer Suazo stopped the dog to do a routine safety 
sweep around the classrooms to ensure no one was hiding there who might 
ambush them, Officer Bias continued toward the school to follow the noise 
he had heard, constantly looking around to ensure no one approached them 
from the school.  R357:129, 132-33; R359:17, 26-27.  Near the building just 
beyond the classrooms, he tracked a rustling noise to the heating/air 
conditioning unit that was against the school wall and surrounded by a 9-
foot high chain link fence.  R357:129; R359:17; State’s Exhs. 27 & 28 (in 
Addendum C).  He did not yell for help because he did not want to 
broadcast his location before he was ready.  R357:130.  Instead, believing 
someone or something was inside the heating unit, he neared the unit, 
identified himself, and ordered the person to come out.  R357:130, 148; 
R359:17.  Getting no response, he moved to within three feet of the unit and 
found Defendant “curled into a ball” inside the heating unit.  R357:129-30, 
132-33, 148-49.  Bias repeated his command numerous times, as did the 
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other uniformed officers who joined him, but Defendant simply made eye 
contact without complying with the orders.  R357:130-33, 149; R359:28-29.  
The only way in or out was a padlocked gate, suggesting Defendant had 
scaled the fence.  R357:130, 134.  No other basis was found for the noise Bias 
heard and no other people were found.  Officers used a bolt cutter on the 
lock, and Defendant eventually came out.  R357:130; R359:18.  When the 
officer asked Defendant why he was hiding, Defendant said, “somebody is 
following me.”  R359:8.  He claimed that he had called 911 to get police to 
help him. 
 Bias concluded that Defendant matched the description of the car 
thief “very well”—he appeared to be Hispanic and was wearing a black 
beanie and a black jacket.  R357:136-37, 141-42; R359:18.1   
The first identification 
 Within five minutes of Officer Bias’s visit, another officer drove Oney 
to identify the abandoned car, then to the schoolyard where Oney positively 
identified Defendant as the man who stole his car.  R357:45-47, 49-51, 91-93, 
135-36.  At the “showup”—held within thirty minutes of the crime—
Defendant was the only non-officer present, was in handcuffs, and was 
                                              
1 A quick search of Defendant revealed no weapons, but a knife was 
found on him during booking.  R359:25-26, 29, 46, 94. 
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illuminated with police spotlights.  R357:49, 93-94; R359:22.  However, Oney 
identified him based on his looks, not the setting.  R357:49-50, 94-95, 106-07.  
Oney testified that Defendant was wearing the black jacket when Oney 
identified him at the showup.  R357:49-50.   
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The second, third, and fourth identifications 
 The State charged Defendant with first-degree-felony aggravated 
robbery.  R1-3.  At a lineup four months after Defendant’s arrest, Oney 
selected Defendant (#6) and one of the other men (#8). R357:51-54, 60-62, 95-
97; State’s Exh. 43 & Def’s Exh. 1 (in Addendum C).  At trial, he explained 
that he recognized Defendant’s eyes, thought his goatee looked familiar, 
and knew that he was the robber, but that one of the other men “looked 
familiar,” prompting the dual identification. R357:62-64.  Oney thereafter 
positively identified Defendant at both the preliminary hearing and the 
trial.  R357:20.   
The trial court’s ruling 
 Before trial, the judge admitted expert testimony from Dr. David 
Dodd, PhD., concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identification 
testimony.  R89-108, 111-18, 142-44; R221; R356:passim.  At the same time, 
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the judge denied Defendant’s pre-trial motion to suppress all of Oney’s 
identifications of Defendant.  R54-55, 60-88; R356:75-76.  The judge ruled: 
 THE COURT: Based upon what I’ve heard today, as well 
as the fact that as I think about five to 7 minutes in this contest 
– five to 7 – 
 [DEF CNSL] Seconds. 
 THE COURT: --seconds, excuse me, in this context, it 
appears sufficiently enough under a dome light and otherwise 
darkened area where it’s – it’s pre-lit to have at least the State in 
this particular case … provided sufficiently reliable evidence to 
suggest that – that identification should not be suppressed and 
for the other factors that [the prosecutor] has articulated all of 
which seem to be frankly compelling associated with the 
identification. [sic]  The Court finds that that test associated 
with sufficiently reliable evidence to support the identification 
has been met by the State.  And the victim in this particular 
case will be entitled to testify about what it is he identified on 
that evening. 
R356:75-76.  The factors articulated by the prosecutor included: 
• Oney and the suspect were face-to-face within a foot of each other for 
5 to 7 seconds; 
 
• the car’s dome light and dashboard lit Defendant’s face the entire 
time; 
 
• Oney kept his eyes on Defendant at all times until Oney reached the 
front of the car where he turned and bolted for the house; 
• Oney’s inability to sleep could have resulted from something other 
than fatigue; 
 
• the car had a fluid leak which led an officer to the abandoned car with 
its door open; 
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• a K9 sniffed the car’s area and led his handler up the nearby sidewalk 
path through the schoolyard to the air conditioning unit outside the 
school; 
 
• an officer heard a fence rattle, followed the noise to the enclosed air 
conditioning unit, and, using a flashlight, saw an individual inside 
meeting Oney’s general description of the robber, including the  
ethnicity, general height and weight, black beanie, and black jacket; 
 
• the suspect’s first words to Oney were “Are you following me” or 
“why are you following me,” and Defendant’s first words to officers 
when found were “I’m being followed”; 
 
• at 4:00 a.m. on a winter morning, Defendant was found within a 
couple of miles of Oney’s home and near the abandoned stolen car; 
• Defendant met the suspect’s general description;  
 
• it is not reasonably likely that many individuals fitting the suspect’s 
general description would be in the area at that time of day; 
 
• Oney identified Defendant at the school within thirty minutes of the 
robbery; and 
• Dodd explained that even though certain details about an 
identification could be wrong, it does not necessarily mean that the 
identification itself is wrong. 
R356:70-75.2   
                                              
2 Although the judge did not make express findings of fact regarding 
the reliability of the identifications, he adopted as “compelling” the 
prosecutor’s articulation of the factors set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1991).  R356:75-76.  Accordingly, this Court should assume that 
the judge found the facts in accord with the prosecutor’s argument.  See id. 
at 787-88 (where “factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by 
the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the record, we ‘assume that 
the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision.’”) (quoting Mower v. 
McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 6, 245 P.2d 224, 226 (1952)).   
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 The prosecutor also reminded the court that an expert would guide 
the jury on weighing each factor. R356:70. Finally, the trial court instructed 
the jury about factors that may affect an identification’s accuracy. R308-11.  
The defense 
 In an effort to undermine the reliability of Oney’s eyewitness 
identification at trial, the defense focused on the differences between Oney’s 
initial description of the robber and Defendant’s appearance when he was 
arrested.  Oney initially described the robber as having “long hair” sticking 
out the bottom of his beanie “maybe an inch,” but Defendant had short, 
almost shaved, hair. R357:85-86; State’s Exh. 43. Oney made no mention of 
facial hair in his initial report and said at the preliminary hearing that he 
saw no facial hair, but testified at trial that he remembered a goatee and that 
the goatee was part of the reason he focused on Defendant at the lineup; 
Defendant sported an untrimmed goatee when arrested.  R357:63-64, 87-89, 
136-37, 149-50; R359:11-12, 18-19. Officer Bias described it as “long scraggly 
facial hair.”  Where Oney consistently maintained that the robber wore a 
black leather jacket during the robbery and at the arrest site, no jacket was 
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inventoried when Defendant was booked, and none was produced at trial.3  
R357:43, 83-84, 106-07, 118; R359:52-53, 58, 69.     
 A jury convicted Defendant as charged.  R286.  Defendant was 
sentenced and timely appealed to this Court, which transferred the case to 
the court of appeals.  R335-38, 340-41, 348-52. 
The court of appeals’ ruling 
 In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a 
new trial.  See generally State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199.  The majority 
identified the five factors articulated in the 1991 case of State v. Ramirez,  
conducted a simple balancing of some of those factors, and concluded that if 
“Ramirez was an extremely close call, we are confident that here” the 
testimony was “legally insufficient” to be deemed reliable.  Id. at ¶¶12-15; 
see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782-84 (Utah 1991).  It based its ruling on 
(1) the “troublesome” suggestiveness of the showup combined with the 
racial difference between Defendant and the eyewitness; (2) differences in 
Oney’s description of the robber the night of the robbery and at trial, 
especially regarding the length of the robber’s hair and the existence of 
facial hair; and (3) Oney’s failure to identify only Defendant at the lineup.  
                                              
3 At least two police officers also remembered Defendant wearing a 
black jacket when he was arrested early on a winter morning, suggesting 
that the jacket was later misplaced.  R357:141-42; R359:46-47. 
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Id. at ¶¶14-15.  The majority ruled the evidence inadmissible, held that the 
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, vacated the conviction, 
and remanded the case for a new trial.  Id. at ¶19. 
 Judge Pearce took the polar opposite position in his dissent, finding it 
impossible to “squint at Ramirez’s holding in a way that permits [one] to see 
how the identification testimony offered in this case is less reliable than the 
testimony the Ramirez court deemed admissible.”  Id. at ¶21 (Pearce, J., 
dissenting).  Judge Pearce reviewed each Ramirez factor, first under 
Ramirez’s facts and then under the facts at hand; he acknowledged the same 
“concerns” noted by the majority.  Id. at ¶¶22-30.  But, unlike the majority, 
he determined that, in “almost all respects, the showup involving 
Defendant in this case was substantially less troublesome than that the 
Ramirez court approved.”  Id. at ¶21.   
 Review of the first three factors led Judge Pearce to find that this case 
fared better then Ramirez on each factor.  Id. at ¶¶24-26 (Pearce, J., 
dissenting).  Only the fourth factor—whether Oney’s identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent—caused Judge Pearce 
concern. Id. at ¶¶27-29. This factor included consideration of the consistency 
of Oney’s descriptions of the robber.  Oney was not fully consistent in his 
identification of Defendant at the lineup where he identified both 
-16- 
Defendant and another man as the robber, was inconsistent in his 
description of Defendant’s facial hair, and was wrong in claiming 
Defendant had long hair.  Id.  at ¶29.  It was these inconsistencies, the judge 
explained, that “present the only way in which this matter could be 
considered a better candidate for reversal than Ramirez.”  Id.  Ultimately, 
however,  there were a “myriad” of other ways in which the testimony 
admitted in Ramirez was more unreliable than the testimony excluded in 
this case, prompting Judge Pearce to believe that the discrepancies were 
insufficient to require reversal under Ramirez.  Id.   
 Finally, Judge Pearce acknowledged that the showup in this case was 
“troublesome,” as was the showup in Ramirez.  Id. at ¶31.  However, where 
a similar showup did not render the eyewitness testimony in Ramirez 
inadmissible, Judge Pearce found no basis for a different outcome in this 
case.  Id.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 I.  Eyewitness identifications.  This Court should clarify its state due 
process model governing the admissibility of eyewitness identifications.  At 
the outset, the right to due process protects against the miscarriage of justice 
resulting from state action.  Absent police conduct causally related to the 
identification, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor 
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has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.  This Court should 
also clarify that State v. Ramirez did not intend to eliminate the conditional 
two-step approach of the federal model applied in Neil v. Biggers.  
 Under step one, trial courts must determine whether the police 
identification procedure itself was suggestive, and if so, to what extent 
(embraced in the fourth Long factor).  If the procedure was not suggestive, 
the evidence should be submitted to the jury without further inquiry from 
the trial court.  If the police identification procedure was suggestive, trial 
courts proceed to step two.  In that step, trial courts must weigh the 
remaining Long factors against the suggestiveness of the identification 
procedure to determine whether the identification was clearly unreliable.  
The identification should be suppressed as constitutionally inadmissible 
only if there is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.  
Short of that, the identification should be submitted to the jury for its 
consideration.  
 The showup by which Kendall Oney first identified Defendant as the 
robber was suggestive but did not produce the victim’s identification of 
Defendant.  Instead, Oney testified that his identification of Defendant was 
prompted by his recognition of the individual, not by the surroundings.   
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 And the witnessing conditions at the time of the crime were 
imminently more reliable than in Ramirez.  As a result, to the extent the 
identification procedure was suggestive, it cannot be said that the 
witnessing conditions were so poor that there was a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.   
 II.  Harmless Error.  Should this Court rule that there was “a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification” requiring exclusion 
of the identification testimony, it must determine whether the error was 
harmless.  The court of appeals’ majority reached this issue and, for the first 
time in this jurisdiction, applied the same standard used for a federal 
constitutional due process error: harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
standard should remain undecided in this jurisdiction because, even if the 
federal standard applies, it was met here.  Even without Oney’s eyewitness 
identification of Defendant at the arrest site, the lineup, the preliminary 
hearing, and the trial, a thorough review of the evidence reveals sufficient 
compelling evidence of Defendant’s guilt to establish that admission of the 
eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
ONEY’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AS THE 
ROBBER WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ADMISSIBLE 
 The court of appeals majority held that Kendall Oney’s identification 
of Defendant as the robber was constitutionally inadmissible under the state 
due process standard articulated in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 
(Utah 1991).  State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶¶11-15.  The dissent 
concluded otherwise, opining that if the identification testimony in Ramirez 
was admissible, so too is the testimony in this case.  Id. at ¶31.   
 Both the majority and the dissent urged review of the Ramirez 
standard for the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony, citing 
its age, the continuing legal and scientific concerns about the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications, and the outcome in this case.  Id. at ¶10, n.1; id. at 
¶21 (Pearce, J., dissenting).  This Court should clarify the state due process 
standard announced in Ramirez and reverse the court of appeals.    
* * * 
 For the most part, the federal constitution protects defendants from 
convictions based on unreliable evidence, “not by prohibiting introduction 
of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury 
that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit.”  Perry v. New 
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Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 723 (2012) (emphasis added).  For example, 
constitutional safeguards to counter unreliable evidence include “the Sixth 
Amendment rights to counsel, compulsory process, and confrontation plus 
cross-examination of witnesses.”  Id. (citations omitted).   
 The same holds true under the Utah Constitution.  Under article I, 
section 12, defendants “have the right to appear and defend … by counsel, 
… to be confronted by the witnesses against” them, and “to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses” on their behalf.  
Utah Const. art. I § 12.  And this Court has recently added to this arsenal of 
weapons by requiring the admission of expert testimony on the fallibility of 
eyewitness identifications in stranger identification cases.  See State v. 
Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶49, 223 P.3d 1103 (“Clopten I”).   
 Typically, then, the reliability of evidence is left for the jury to test 
through the crucible of trial, with all of its safeguards for determining the 
truth.  Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 723.  There is a rare exception—when improper 
police conduct renders the evidence so unreliable that its admission can be 
said to deny a defendant his due process right to a fair trial.  For example, 
suppression is constitutionally required when a confession is prompted by 
police interrogation techniques that “ ‘are so offensive to a civilized system 
of justice that they must be condemned.’ ”  State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 
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¶11, 984 P.2d 1009 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,163 (1986)).  
Similarly, suppression is constitutionally required where an identification 
results from a police identification procedure that is “‘unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to deny the 
accused a fair trial.’”  State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1985) 
(emphasis added).  
A. A defendant’s due process rights under the Utah Constitution 
are not implicated absent State conduct. 
 At the outset, it is important to clarify that due process concerns 
under the Utah Constitution do not arise absent State conduct.  This Court 
has never suggested that an eyewitness identification not prompted by the 
police implicates state due process.  Indeed, almost every case before this 
Court that has addressed the state constitutional admissibility of an 
eyewitness identification has involved at least an “arguably suggestive” 
police identification procedure.  See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777-84 (addressing 
admissibility of identification following one-person showup arranged by 
police); see also State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ¶¶9-11, 29-64, 44 P.3d 794 
(admissibility of identification following police lineup); State v. Hoffhine, 
2001 UT 4, ¶¶7,13-19, 20 P.3d 265 (addressing admissibility of identification 
following two-person showup arranged by police); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 
57, ¶¶7,41-47, 993 P.2d 837 (addressing admissibility of identification 
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following police lineup); State v. Willett,  909 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1995) 
(same); but see State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶¶8, 25-30, 48 P.3d 953 
(concluding that police-administered photo array presentation not 
suggestive).  
 This Court’s due process jurisprudence in other contexts has also 
centered on the concern that government action may result in the 
deprivation of a defendant’s due process right to fundamental fairness.  For 
example, the Court has held that due process concerns may arise when 
prosecutors engage in “potentially abusive practices” against a criminal 
defendant.  See State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113, ¶20, 37 P.3d 1160.  The Court has 
likewise held that due process concerns may arise when a prosecutor 
destroys or loses exculpatory evidence.  See State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 
¶¶39-46, 162 P.3d 1106.  Due process concerns do not arise absent 
government action. 
 This Court in Ramirez likened the standard by which the admissibility 
of eyewitness identification evidence is determined to the standard applied 
when considering the constitutional admissibility of a confession.  Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 778.  Under that standard, the trial court acts as a “gatekeeper to 
carefully scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects.”  Id.  
Significantly, “ ‘[a]bsent police conduct causally related to the confession, 
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there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a 
criminal defendant of due process of law.’ ”4  Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶18 
(quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164).  This Court should thus recognize, that 
absent police conduct related to an identification, there is no basis for 
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of state 
due process of law. 
 As the United States Supreme Court recently explained in discussing 
the federal model, “the potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not 
alone render its introduction at the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.”  
Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 728.  Simply put, “[t]he fallibility of eyewitness evidence 
does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process 
rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before 
allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.”  Id.  The purpose of the due 
process requirement “is not to displace the adversary system as the primary 
means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of 
justice does not occur.”  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).  That 
is, a miscarriage of justice that results from State conduct.  See Perry, 132 
S.Ct. at 726 (observing that the very purpose of the “due process check” is 
                                              
4 The Court has not articulated a state due process standard for 
confessions different from the federal standard. 
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“to avoid depriving the jury of identification evidence that is reliable, 
notwithstanding improper police conduct”).   
 Absent some police misconduct, a defendant’s right to a fair trial is 
fully protected by the constitutional safeguards of effective counsel, 
compulsory process, confrontation, cross-examination, and the requirement 
that the State prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id at 
728-29.  Added to that, this Court has now recognized a defendant’s right to 
call qualified experts to educate the jury on factors that may affect the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications.  See Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶49.  
These measures, together with the rules of evidence, are more than 
sufficient to protect criminal defendants from convictions based on 
unreliable evidence.  See Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 729 (noting protection afforded 
by eyewitness expert testimony recognized in Clopten I).  
 In sum, like federal due process, state due process does not require a 
preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification not prompted by police conduct.  Rather, the safeguards 
against conviction based on unreliable evidence rest in the trial rights of 
article I, section 12, and the rules of evidence. 
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B. Ramirez did not purport to abandon the conditional two-step 
approach of the federal model. 
 Historically, Utah courts examined the constitutional admissibility of 
an eyewitness identification under the federal due process standard.  See 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779.  In Ramirez, the Court adopted a somewhat 
different standard under state due process.  Id. at 780.  But the principle 
underlying both standards remained the same—a suggestive identification 
procedure administered by the police might render an identification so 
unreliable that its admission can be said to deny a defendant his due 
process right to a fair trial.  
1. The federal due process model is a conditional two-step 
analysis. 
 Before Ramirez, this Court had “simply applied the federal analytical 
model for determining the reliability, and hence the admissibility” of an 
eyewitness identification.  Id. at 779.  The federal model involves a 
conditional two-step analysis.  As a threshold matter, a court must 
determine whether the police used an “unnecessarily suggestive” 
identification procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification.  Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197-99 (1972). If not, the court’s due process inquiry 
ends.  See id.  But if police do employ an unnecessarily suggestive identi-
fication procedure, the court proceeds to step two—it must determine 
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“whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification was 
[sufficiently] reliable even though the confrontation procedure [employed 
by police] was suggestive.”  Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. 
 When assessing the reliability of a tainted identification under step 
two of the federal model, courts must consider the “totality of the 
circumstances” surrounding the tainted identification in light of five 
reliability factors:  
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the 
time of the crime, [2] the witness’ degree of attention, [3] the 
accuracy of the witness’ description of the criminal, [4] the level 
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, 
and [5] the length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779.  The “Biggers 
factors” are “weighed [against] the corrupting effect of the suggestive 
identification itself” to determine whether “there is ‘a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ”  Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 
98, 114, 116 (1977) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 
(1968)).  If so, the identification is constitutionally inadmissible.  But “[s]hort 
of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh.”  Id. at 116. 
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2. Ramirez sought only to replace the Biggers factors with 
the Long factors. 
 In purporting to follow Ramirez, the court of appeals applied a state 
due process model not contemplated by Ramirez.  Rather than applying a 
conditional two-step analysis, the court of appeals treated the 
suggestiveness of police identification procedures and the overall reliability 
of an identification as a single inquiry which could result in suppression 
under state due process.  See Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶¶11-15. 
 In articulating its approach for determining the constitutional 
admissibility of an identification, the court of appeals purported to do no 
more than summarize the Ramirez analysis.  See id. But Ramirez did not 
suggest such a fundamental departure from the federal analysis.  To be 
sure, Ramirez broke “new ground under the Utah Constitution” in assessing 
the constitutional admissibility of eyewitness identifications.  Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 778.  But the state analytical model adopted in Ramirez only 
“diverges somewhat” from the federal model.  Id.  Ramirez did not take 
issue with the conditional two-step approach of the federal model.  Rather, 
it only faulted the federal standard used for judging the reliability of 
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“arguably suggestive eyewitness identifications” under step two of the 
federal model.5  Id. at 779-81.  
 Ramirez rejected the Biggers factors for step two as “scientifically 
unsupported” for assessing the reliability of an identification.  Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 780.  In their place, Ramirez required an appraisal of a suggestive 
identification’s reliability based on the “different criteria” identified in State 
v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986): 
“(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during 
the event; (2) the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event; (3) the witness’s capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; 
(4) whether the witness’s identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether 
it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive, remember and relate it correctly.” 
817 P.2d at 780-81 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493).  The Long factors, the 
Court held, “more precisely define the focus of the relevant inquiry” into 
reliability.  Id. at 781.   
 The Ramirez court misapprehended the federal due process model in 
one respect.  The Court stated that the element of “suggestibility” included 
in the fourth Long factor has “no comparable emphasis given to [it] by 
                                              
5 Here, the court of appeals misinterpreted Ramirez to mean the 
appropriate analysis under the state constitution consists of only step 2. 
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Biggers.”  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.  That is incorrect.  Long’s “suggestibility” 
inquiry is, in fact, the focus of step one under the federal due process model 
and the subject against which the Biggers factors are weighed under step 
two.  See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (“Against these factors is to be weighed 
the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.”).   
 In sum, Ramirez did not suggest that a trial court’s role in screening 
identification evidence “for constitutional defects” includes a general 
reliability analysis absent a suggestive police identification procedure.  See 
817 P.2d at 778.  It “depart[ed] from federal case law only to the degree that” 
some of the Biggers criteria rendered “the federal analytical model scientifically 
unsupported.”  Id. at 780 (emphasis added).  But see Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶25 
(suggesting that suggestive police procedures and general unreliability of 
evidence are independent bases for excluding eyewitness identifications).   
C. This Court should clarify its state due process analysis. 
 Because Ramirez did not purport to eliminate step one of the federal 
analysis, this Court should clarify Ramirez to prevent further confusion 
about and misapplication of the state due process analysis.  This Court 
should clarify that, like the federal due process model, the state due process 
model involves a conditional two-step analysis incorporating the Long 
factors. 
-30- 
1. Step One—assessing the suggestiveness of the police 
identification procedure. 
 First, a defendant seeking the exclusion of an eyewitness 
identification must establish that police used an “unnecessarily suggestive” 
identification procedure, Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197-99, or, at a minimum, an 
“arguably suggestive” identification procedure, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779.6  
This step embraces the fourth Long factor addressing “suggestibility.”  See 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; Long, 721 P.2d at 493 (asking whether “witness’s 
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, 
or whether it was the product of suggestion”).  If a defendant meets that 
burden, the court may proceed to step two.  But if not, the witness’s 
identification should be submitted to the jury without further inquiry by the 
trial court.  
2. Step Two—weighing the Long factors against the 
suggestiveness of the police identification procedure. 
 Second—if the defendant satisfies step one—the trial court should 
then weigh the Long factors (except the fourth factor) against the 
suggestiveness of the police identification procedure itself (as assessed 
under the fourth Long factor).  See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.  The question 
                                              
6 Ramirez could be read to imply that rather than showing that the 
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the defendant need 
only show that it was “arguably suggestive.” 817 P.2d at 779. 
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here is “whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification 
was [sufficiently] reliable even though the confrontation procedure 
[employed by police] was suggestive.”  Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; accord 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶30 (holding that proper inquiry is whether 
identification “is sufficiently reliable such that it can be presented to the jury 
for their deliberation”).  
 This Court has held that in weighing the Long factors, trial courts 
must determine whether the identification “was sufficiently reliable so as 
not to offend defendant’s right to due process by permitting clearly 
unreliable identification testimony before the jury.”  Id.  The Court has not 
expounded on the “clearly unreliable” standard.  But it appears to be the 
equivalent of the federal due process standard—the defendant must show 
“ ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ”  Brathwaite, 
432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384).  It is a heavy burden, as 
the outcome in Ramirez makes clear.  There, the Court held that the 
eyewitness identification was sufficiently reliable notwithstanding the 
“blatant suggestiveness” of the one-man showup and the relatively poor 
witnessing conditions surrounding the crime (no one ever saw the 
perpetrator’s full face).  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.  
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 In sum, an eyewitness identification should be excluded only if the 
weighing under step two results in a determination that notwithstanding 
the suggestive police identification procedure, the identification was clearly 
unreliable, i.e., “there is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.’ ”  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 
384).  Short of that, “[c]ourts need not, nor should they, step into the 
province of the jury and decide the ultimate matter of identification for the 
jurors.”  Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶30.  It certainly should not do so as a 
constitutional matter.  This is particularly true where the constitution and 
rules of evidence equip a defendant with the tools necessary to challenge 
unreliable evidence. 
D. Kenneth Oney’s identification of Defendant as the robber 
was not constitutionally unreliable. 
 Like Ramirez, the showup identification of Defendant in this case was 
suggestive. But unlike Ramirez, the eyewitness testified that it was not the 
basis for his identification.  And unlike Ramirez, the witnessing conditions 
here were eminently more reliable.  As the dissent noted, one has to “squint 
at Ramirez’s holding” to conclude otherwise.  Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 21.   
When the suggestiveness of the arrest-site lineup (Long’s fourth factor) is 
weighed against the remaining Long factors, it cannot be said that there was 
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a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.  This Court 
should thus reverse the court of appeal’s ruling to the contrary. 
1. The arrest-site identification was at least arguably 
suggestive. 
 As explained, the first step in the due process inquiry is whether 
Oney’s identification of Defendant at the arrest site “‘was the product of 
suggestion,’” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493), and if 
so, to what extent.  As explained, this inquiry embraces the fourth Long 
factor. The variables subject to consideration under this inquiry are usefully 
divided into two categories: (a) the circumstances of the identification 
procedure itself that may be suggestive (procedural factors), and (b) witness 
behavior that may signal that the identification was the product of 
suggestion rather than memory (witness factors). A review of these 
circumstances shows that Oney’s arrest-site identification was less 
suggestive than in Ramirez.  However, even if it was equally suggestive, the 
inquiry does not end. 
(a)  Procedural factors of arrest-site identification. 
 Relevant factors in evaluating the circumstances surrounding the 
identification procedure include “the length of time between observation 
and identification, … the value of lineups compared to showups, the value 
of photo identifications compared to in-person identifications,” and 
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potentially suggestive police conduct, such as the instructions given to the 
eyewitness by police, the composition of the lineup, the way in which the 
lineup was carried out, and the behaviors of the person conducting the 
lineup.” Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶32 n.22; accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 
(citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494, n.8). 
 A showup is often considered “inherently suggestive because it 
involves the presentation of a single suspect to a witness by the police (as 
opposed to a lineup, in which several individuals are presented to the 
police, only one of whom is the suspect).” Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 88  
(2nd Cir. 2009). Such was the case in Ramirez: the witness’s identification of 
Ramirez “took place on the street in the middle of the night. Ramirez, with 
dark complexion and long hair, was the only person at the showup who 
was not a police officer. He stood with his hands cuffed to a chain link fence 
behind his back. [And the] headlights of several police cars were trained on 
him.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. The showup in Ramirez was a blatantly 
suggestive procedure. Id.  
 As in Ramirez, the identification here was made soon after the 
robbery—within 20 minutes—but that fact is a favorable factor. R357:106-07. 
According to Defendant’s expert, a short interval improves accuracy.  
R358:52. The field identification was also similar.  Like Ramirez, Defendant 
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was presented to Oney in the early hours of the morning, was the only non-
officer present, was handcuffed, was accompanied by police officers, and 
was illuminated by the headlights of police cars.  R357:49-51.   
(b)  Witness factors. 
 Relevant factors in evaluating witness behavior that might indicate an 
identification was the product of a suggestive procedure include (1) 
spontaneity and consistency in making the identification, (2) a weakened or 
compromised mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the 
identification, (3) “instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses to the 
event failed to identify defendant,” and (4) “instances when the witness or 
other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with 
defendant.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781, 783. Witness confidence is another 
relevant factor that may be examined. See State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ¶23, 
133 P.3d 363 (holding that courts may also “weigh certainty testimony” in 
assessing reliability, even though not required to be considered under 
Ramirez). 
 No one established Oney’s state of mind at the time of the showup.  
Oney said he was “pretty distraught” when police arrived within five 
minutes of his call to 911.  R357:91.  He identified Defendant at the showup 
approximately 20 minutes after that.  R357:106-07.  By that time, he had not 
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only gotten an immediate response to his 911 call and explained the 
situation to the officers, but he had recovered his stolen car.  Such a fast and 
positive development would go far in soothing any remaining anxiety.  
Nothing suggested that he was emotional or distraught at the time.  Further, 
Oney made his identification from the safety and anonymity of the police 
cruiser, eliminating any potential fear from the possibility of reprisal if the 
suspect saw him.  R537:93.  When asked if Defendant was the robber, Oney 
immediately answered “yes,” noting that it was “definitely him.”  R357:93-
94, 135-36.  No one suggested that he make a positive identification, and on 
the way over he was simply told that they had “probably found the 
suspect.”  R357:91-92.  Oney’s quick, positive identification suggests that it 
was the product of memory, not suggestion.  See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶28 
(recognizing that spontaneous identification supports finding of reliability).  
Unlike Ramirez, he confirmed as much, explaining that he identified 
Defendant because of his looks, not because of the setting in which the 
identification took place.  R357:49-50. 94-95, 106-07.  And although witness 
confidence is no guarantee of accuracy, Oney’s certainty was a factor that 
made it slightly more likely that the identification was reliable.  See Guzman, 
2006 UT 12, ¶22 (recognizing eyewitness confidence as factor favoring 
reliability).   
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 Oney consistently identified Defendant as the robber after the 
showup, although with somewhat less confidence at the lineup four months 
later.  He picked Defendant because he remembered his eyes and thought 
his goatee looked familiar.  R357:63-64.  However, he hesitated because he 
believed the robber would not be in the lineup based on a phone call he had 
received the previous day and because he thought another person in the 
lineup “looked familiar.”  R357:60-64.  Consequently, he chose both men.  
Id.  He later positively identified Defendant at the preliminary hearing and 
at trial.  See R355:5-6; R357:20.  His partial identification may adversely 
impact the reliability of his identification to some degree, but that is only 
one of the relevant considerations. 
 Finally, the inconsistencies in Oney’s descriptions of the robber—the 
hair, the jacket, and the goatee—were reasonably explained.  Through 
Defendant’s expert, the prosecutor established that lighting and proximity 
can both obscure or distort things.  R358:56-57.  And officers corroborated 
the existence of the jacket at the arrest site.   
 In sum, the arrest-site identification procedure employed by police in 
this case was less suggestive than the showup in Ramirez, where one of 
three victims sat in a police car and positively identified Ramirez as the 
masked man who robbed him earlier in the night while Ramirez was alone 
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and chained to a fence at one in the morning in the headlights of police cars.  
817 P.2d at 777.  While the procedural factors of the arrest-site identification 
paralleled those present in Ramirez, the witness factors demonstrate that 
Oney’s identification was the product of memory, not suggestion.  Most 
significantly, unlike Ramirez, Oney expressly stated that his identification of 
Defendant at the showup was based on his memory of the robber, not the 
circumstances surrounding the showup.  
 But even if it were unnecessarily suggestive, when weighed against 
the Long factors—which this Court in Ramirez found to be more scientifically 
sound than the Biggers factors—it does not produce “a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”  Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, 116 
(citation and quotation omitted).   
2.  Witnessing conditions at the crime scene. 
 Even if the identification procedure were suggestive, an evaluation of 
the Long factors against the suggestiveness of the identification procedure 
(to whatever extent that was) establishes that the identification was 
“sufficiently reliable so as not to offend defendant’s right to due process.”  
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶30.  
* * * 
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 As explained, step two requires courts to weigh the remaining Long 
factors against the suggestive influence of the identification procedure.  
Although Long identifies four remaining factors, they are better understood 
as “witnessing conditions,” with the last two factors combining to reflect a 
single condition: (1) “the opportunity of the witness to view” the 
perpetrator during the crime; (2) “the witness’s degree of attention” to the 
perpetrator at the time of the crime; and (3) the witness’s “capacity” to 
reliably identify the perpetrator given “the nature of the event being 
observed” and the witness’s “physical and mental acuity.”  Long, 721 P.2d at 
493.  Courts should weigh these witnessing conditions to determine “the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate” the event 
correctly.  Id.  
(a) Opportunity to view robber during the robbery. 
 The first witnessing condition is the witness’s opportunity to view the 
perpetrator during the crime.  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.  Relevant factors 
include overall visibility, such as lighting and obstructions; the distance 
between the witness and the actor; the length of time the witness viewed the 
actor; and whether the witness could see the actor’s face, which may be 
adversely affected if the actor is wearing a disguise, such as a mask, hat, or 
sunglasses.  Id. at 782; see also Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶32 n.22; Gary L. Wells, 
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Amina Memon, & Stephen D. Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence: Improving its 
Probative Value, 7 Psychological Science in the Public Interest 45, 53-54 (2006) 
(“Wells, Memon, & Penrod”); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Olson, Eyewitness 
Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277, 281 (2003) (“Wells & Olson”) (in 
Addendum D).   
 Although the robbery occurred at 3:30 in the morning, Oney had 
ample opportunity and ability to see the robber.  His initial contact with the 
robber occurred at close range—from about ten inches—within the confines 
of Oney’s car door under the car’s “[f]airly bright” interior lighting.  For a 
full ten seconds, Oney was face to face with the robber’s undisguised face 
under the dome and dashboard lights.  When the two stood, Oney had the 
benefit of several illumination sources in which to see the robber’s 
unmasked face, including the car’s headlights, a nearby porch light, two 
street lights, and a neighbor’s flood light.  Although the lights were not 
directed at the robber’s face, the bare trees permitted the maximum amount 
of light from each source to reach the area, resulting in “pretty bright” 
illumination.  R357:18-19, 22-23, 25-29, 30-35, 67-72; State’s Exhs. 9, 16-19.  
Oney kept his eyes on the robber throughout the ordeal, talking calmly to 
him.  Standing face-to-face and almost touching, Oney moved slowly 
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around the robber and the car, with the robber keeping pace with him and 
ultimately moving into the car’s headlights. 
 Despite the close proximity, Oney did not initially mention 
Defendant’s untrimmed salt and pepper goatee until expressly asked about 
facial hair at the preliminary hearing.  The omission does not necessarily 
demonstrate that Oney lacked sufficient opportunity to make a reliable 
identification.  Officer Bias admitted cutting short his initial investigation 
with Oney to follow the liquid trail left by the stolen car, suggesting Oney 
may not have gotten to that part of his identification and did not need to 
revisit it once Defendant was arrested.  Until questioned about it at the 
preliminary hearing, Oney had no reason to believe he had omitted 
anything from his description of the robber. Moreover, while the lighting 
and proximity were sufficient to see the robber’s face, they may have been 
insufficient to permit Oney to see the delineation between Defendant’s face 
and his “scraggly” salt and pepper facial hair.  See R358:56 (expert 
admission that things may be obscured by close proximity); R358:57 (expert 
opinion that features may be obscured depending on the lighting).    As the 
lighting was not directed at the robber’s face throughout the ordeal, any 
resulting shadows could effectively minimize the differences between the 
robber’s face and his facial hair. 
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  Additionally, Oney described the robber as wearing a black beanie 
that fit tight to his skull, obviously preventing Oney from realizing that the 
robber had a shaved head.  He also believed he saw long, straight hair 
sticking out of the bottom of the beanie, although Defendant had none at 
the time of his arrest.  Again, the mistake does not necessarily demonstrate 
that Oney lacked sufficient opportunity to make a reliable identification.  
Defendant’s expert recognized that perception and ability to pick out 
features may change based on any number of factors, including distance 
and lighting.  R358:54-57.  Here, the close proximity of the men’s faces 
during the initial seconds of their interaction, Oney’s fixation on the 
robber’s face, and the multidirectional lighting both at the car door and 
outside, either individually or combined, could be expected to obscure some 
features but not others.  Defendant’s expert did not rule out the possibility 
that, in the right lighting, a stand-up collar on the robber’s shirt or jacket 
could give the impression of long, straight hair.  See R358:57. 
 Finally, Oney’s repeated assertion that the robber wore a black leather 
coat strengthened his credibility.  Oney consistently explained throughout 
this case that the robber wore a longish black coat, beginning with his first 
report to police and continuing through trial.  He also maintained that 
Defendant was wearing the coat when he identified Defendant at the arrest 
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site.  It is true that the jacket did not make it through processing at the jail 
and, hence, could not be produced at trial.  But two officers who dealt with 
Defendant at the arrest site also testified that he was wearing a black jacket.  
Their testimony not only corroborated Oney’s description but reinforces the 
fact that Oney’s close proximity to the robber, the indirect lighting and 
Oney’s focus on the robber’s face and hands provided him with ample 
opportunity to accurately view the robber.   
 (b) Degree of attention Oney gave to robber. 
 The second witnessing condition is the witness’s “degree of 
attention” to the perpetrator at the time of the crime.  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
781.  Relevant factors include when the witness becomes aware that a crime 
is being committed, the amount and type of attention that the witness gives 
to the perpetrator, and the presence of distractions that may draw a 
witness’s attention away from the perpetrator, e.g., noises or other activity.  
See id. (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 423).  Distractions may include the presence 
or use of a weapon, which laboratory research has shown may result in 
modest impairment to identification accuracy.7  Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 
                                              
7 Although the Court in Long and Ramirez placed distractions under 
the “opportunity to observe” factor, it is more appropriately analyzed here 
because distractions do not deprive the witness of the opportunity to 
observe; rather, they compete for the witness’s attention during that 
window of opportunity. 
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supra, at 53.  On the other hand, the findings of field research on weapon 
focus have been “somewhat conflicting.”  Id.  
 Oney’s awareness of the robber was immediate, with the robber 
physically placing himself in Oney’s face while Oney sat in the confines of 
his driver’s seat.  Oney’s attention focused solely on Defendant from that 
moment and remained there throughout the entire ordeal.  The robber did 
not run or attempt to hide but remained facing Oney without a disguise.   
 Until the robber stood, Oney gave him his full attention without 
concern for either a weapon or any criminal conduct: the robber had Oney’s 
full attention.  Although the robber reached for the handle of something 
once he stood up, he did not withdraw the item and at no time did he 
brandish, let alone use, a weapon.  Oney noticed the movement, which 
prompted him to include the robber’s hands in his visual field and to 
formulate a mental escape plan.  He did not look away from the robber, 
however, and he remained so focused on the robber that his memory 
included the robber’s conversation.  No external noises or distractions 
prompted Oney to divert or diminish his attention on the robber. 
(c)  Oney’s capacity to observe the robber given the nature 
of the event.   
 The final witnessing condition is the witness’s capacity to reliably 
identify the perpetrator given the nature of the event being observed and 
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the witness’s physical and mental acuity.  Long, 721 P.2d at 493.  Relevant 
factors include the witness’s age (research has shown that very young 
children and the elderly perform worse than other adults); the witness’s 
physical limitations, such as uncorrected visual defects, fatigue, injury, 
intoxication, or extremely low intelligence; the witness’s emotional state; the 
witness’s personal motivations, biases, or prejudices; the distinctiveness of 
the perpetrator’s appearance; and the race of the witness relative to the race 
of the perpetrator.  See id.; see also Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶32 n.22.  Also 
relevant is whether the witness’s capacity to observe was impaired by stress 
or fright at the time of the observation.  Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶32 n.22. 
 Oney’s physical abilities were not in any way impaired at the time of 
the robbery.  He had not been drinking, there was no evidence of fatigue, 
and he was wearing his glasses at the time.  R357:108-09. There was no 
evidence of any other mental or physical concerns or limitation that would 
adversely affect his capacity to reliably identify the robber.  Neither was 
there evidence of “weapon-focus effect” that tends to decrease the reliability 
of eyewitness identification.  See R358:26-32; Wells & Olson, at 282, supra.  
There was no weapon or other express threat used in the robbery.  Oney 
believed the robber reached for what might have been a weapon at one 
point, but no weapon was ever produced.  In any event, prior to that time, 
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Oney had no reason to suspect the robber possessed a weapon.  And 
regardless of that possibility, Oney remained calm and in control through 
the remainder of the encounter, quickly creating and executing an escape 
plan and calmly talking to the robber until he succeeded in his escape.     
 Additionally, nothing in the circumstances surrounding the 
identification or involving Oney himself suggests that he suffered such a 
heightened degree of stress that it rendered his identification suspect.  See 
R358:26-32.  While Oney was surprised at the robber’s sudden appearance, 
nothing about the situation at that point suggested he suffered any undue 
stress from the man’s presence: he simply thought the robber might want a 
drink or a ride.  R357:18. It was nowhere near the hightened stress of 
Ramirez, where the witness was struck once and nearly twice with a pipe, 
was continually threatened with the pipe while another robber pointed a 
gun at him and issued more threats.  817 P.2d at 783.  Arguably, under the 
circumstances, any fear Oney harbored did not raise to even the “ordinary 
fear” of a victim, which would not prevent the accurate observation and 
perception of events.  State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah App. 1998) 
(victim’s ordinary fear is not alone sufficient to defeat the third Ramirez 
factor).   
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 Finally, Oney did not have the same racial background as Defendant, 
which may create a slightly higher risk of misidentification.  See R358:58; 
Wells & Olson, at 280-81 (despite extensive examination, “no consistent 
overall differences attributable to race have emerged;” we simply know 
people are better able to recognize faces of their own race).  On the other 
hand, a witness’s prior exposure to the offender’s race is a factor to be 
considered in assessing their ability to make an accurate identification.  
R358:49.   
 Oney was forty years old, had lived in the same area for fourteen or 
fifteen years, and had lived in the same neighborhood for two.  R357:15-16, 
100-01.  A number of his neighbors were Hispanic, including those on either 
side and across the street, giving him an easy familiarity with their features.  
R357:44.  His familiarity with the characteristics of Hispanics generally 
would tend to counter concerns of cross-racial bias.  The court of appeals 
made no mention of this fact, however.  Instead, the majority of that court 
determined that Oney’s close, unobscured exposure to the robber’s entire 
face was a barrier to an accurate identification of the robber solely because 
of the concern for cross-racial bias.  Proper consideration of Oney’s 
familiarity with Defendant’s race along with the duration and proximity of 
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the viewing in the lighted confines of the car door weigh in favor of a 
reliable identification. 
* * * 
 In sum, the witnessing conditions were not so poor as to create a due 
process concern.  The witnessing conditions were better than those in 
Ramirez, where most of the gunman’s face was covered with a scarf and the 
witness was the object of an assault and threatened assault with a gun.  
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-83.  Indeed, the witnessing conditions were, in most 
respects, much better than those in most crimes—the robber was wearing 
distinctive clothing but no mask, brandished no weapon, made no threats, 
and approached the victim in close proximity under numerous light 
sources.  When these witnessing conditions are weighed against the arrest-
site showup, it cannot be said that there was a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification.  Accordingly, any reliability concerns were 
properly left for the jury to decide.   
 Indeed, the jury had before it all the tools necessary to assess the 
reliability of Oney’s identification testimony: the testimony of the defense 
expert on factors affecting the reliability of identifications, a jury instruction 
on point, and the argument of both counsel in closing, all of which informed 
the jurors in their consideration of the identification evidence.  Defendant 
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adduced the expert’s testimony objection-free and without limitation and 
argued his testimony in closing. Defendant took advantage of every 
opportunity provided for testing the reliability of the evidence and 
influencing the jury’s consideration of it.   Thus, even though the showup 
was arguably as suggestive as the one conducted in Ramirez, the 
identification was subject to comprehensive scrutiny by the jury, in keeping 
with the continuing development of eyewitness memory science in the 
years since Ramirez.     
II. 
IN ANY EVENT, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT 
 If, as the State contends, Oney’s identification was sufficiently reliable 
to be presented to the jury for their deliberation, this Court’s review is 
ended, and the court of appeals’ decision should be reversed.  See Point I, 
supra.  If, however, this Court determines that under the appropriate 
application of Ramirez, there was “a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification” requiring exclusion of the identification 
testimony, it must determine whether the error was harmless.  Brathwaite, 
432 U.S. at 116 (quotation omitted).   
 This Court has yet to squarely decide whether the harmless error 
standard applicable to a preserved state constitutional error in admission of 
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eyewitness identification testimony is the erosion of confidence standard or 
the stricter federal “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The 
court of appeals’ majority determined that the error must be reviewed 
under the same standard that applies to federal constitutional due process 
errors.  2015 UT App. 199, ¶16 & n.2 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 24 (1967)).   They did so based on this Court’s recognition in Ramirez that 
Utah’s state constitutional due process analysis “is certainly as stringent as” 
the federal analysis.  Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶16, n.2.  However, this Court 
went on to require that Ramirez demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result had the identification not been admitted.”  Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 788.  The same standard has since been repeatedly applied.  See 
State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v. Clopten, 
2009 UT 84, ¶39.   
 Because the issue of whether the burden shifts to the State to prove 
that a preserved state constitutional error in admission of eyewitness 
identification testimony is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter 
of first impression, it should be decided by this Court.  See Utah R. App. P. 
46(a)(4).  See also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶16, n.2 (explaining majority’s 
reasoning for applying federal prejudice standard without prior direction 
by this Court).   
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   There is, however, no reason to reach that issue in this case because 
even assuming application of the federal standard, any error in admitting 
Oney’s identifications was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 Factors that determine whether an error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt include “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the 
prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or 
absence of evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.”  
State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (quotation omitted). 
 Even without Oney’s identification of Defendant, the jury would still 
have the benefit of his description of the robber, the bases for his 
description—unchallenged by expert testimony criticizing the reliability of 
his observations—and corroboration from Officer Bias that he believed 
Defendant matched the description and from both Officer Bias and Officer 
Deven Mayer that Defendant was wearing a black jacket when he was 
found.  The prosecutor would provide the same explanations for the 
discrepancies involving the hair, goatee, and black jacket.  The jury would 
also have the string of events that led the officers to the car and the school 
yard within minutes of the robbery, the dog’s immediate discernment of a 
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lone scent leading down the pathway and through the school yard in the 
very direction officers later found the only person in the area, as well as the 
timing of the noise indicating the suspect jumped a fence just as the officer 
began following the dog through the school yard.  Officer Bias would 
explain how the dog led officers toward the school but was stopped short of 
the school to do a safety sweep of the portable classrooms that they 
necessarily passed on their way to the school.8  Instead of waiting to 
complete the sweep, Officer Bias continued in the direction the dog had 
indicated, rounded a corner of the school, and found Defendant.  Moreover, 
despite establishing an immediate containment zone, no one but Defendant 
was found anywhere in the area.   
 In addition, the jury would hear the circumstances surrounding 
Defendant’s discovery and arrest at the school, including the indications 
that he was hiding in an out-of-the-way place requiring the use of a 
flashlight to see him, the fact that he stared at the officers while refusing to 
obey their repeated commands to come out of the unit yet claimed 
                                              
8 The court of appeals’ majority suggests that the dog led the officers 
to the classrooms and stopped instead of leading them to the school.  2015 
UT App 199, ¶18.  That interpretation is not supported by the record 
evidence.  R357:128-29, 145-47; R359:17-18, 26-28; State’s Exhs. 27 & 28.  The 
dog was stopped for safety reasons at outbuildings located on their path to 
the school.  Nothing suggests the dog initiated the stop. 
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thereafter that he called police to come to his aid.  Those circumstances 
strongly suggest that Defendant was hiding from the visible police 
presence.  Further, he was found in possession of a knife, corroborating 
Oney’s testimony that he reached for something tucked in his waistband.  
And finally, they would have the condemningly similar words uttered by 
the robber and by Defendant that someone was “following me.”  
 Given this compelling evidence, any error in the admission of Oney’s 
identification testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
 Respectfully submitted on April 25, 2016. 
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